Th is article is devoted to the issue of national identity and political preferences of the region of Central Ukraine. Th e essence of the "in-the-middle" position is tested using a national representative survey known as "Ukrainian Society" for the period of 2000-2012. Th is longitudinal survey allows for the delineation of tendencies of well-articulated political identities. Th is includes Galicia being compared to Crimea and Donbas. In this study these areas are compared to those of the Center, a region with an identity lacking thorough study. Th e specifi c trends in the development of a national identity and of political preferences are defi ned and compared within rural and urban populations in the analysed regions. Th e Center was chosen as a comparison to other Ukrainian regions as it characterizes the mobilization of political support in the formative years of Ukraine, commencing with the Orange Revolution in the fall of 2004.
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In Central Ukraine, since the fall of Kievan Rus', the successor territories passed from hand to hand. In the 16 th century, it became a part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (formerly the Grand Duchy of Lithuania). However, in the 16 th century, the period of foreign rule in Ukraine was interrupted and groups of paramilitary Cossacks established their own state. Th e Cossack State was a unique attempt to create a state administration under the leadership of the local military elite -the Cossacks. It was the only attempt to create a sovereign Ukrainian state on the territory of Ukraine prior to 1917. Whatever the limitations of the "statehood" of the Cossack state, one can hardly deny that 150 years of political autonomy gave Ukrainians the sense of national self-awareness, an experience of political self-organization, and an idea of democratic rule.
Aft er the abolishment of the Cossack rule in the 17 th century, the area became a Russian protectorate. Modernization of the Cossack lands, which included most of the Center and partially south of modern Ukraine, occurred under the aegis of St Petersburg and Moscow. It fi rst spread to the Cossack lands and later to a scarcely-occupied Wild Steppe -Southern Ukraine, which later became known as the state project Novorossia. "Urbanization, industrialization, and transportation went hand in hand, as did education, communication, and social and ethnic diff erentiation" (Motyl and Krawchenko 1997, p.239) . Since the end of the 19 th century, the modernization of Ukraine acquired the features of an industrial revolution with its culmination seen in the political project of the USSR, which was a "superior form of modernity, the corresponding attainment of high international status, a broad conception of social welfare, and a sense of social justice that was built into property relations" (Kotkin, 1995, p.358) .
In western Ukrainian lands, which were under the protectorate of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the modernization of the Ukrainian peasantry was held back by the Polish gentry. Still, thanks to Austro-Hungarian liberal reforms, Ukrainians achieved the right to represent their political interests in the Austro-Hungarian Parliament, started to organize their economic activity in cooperative and credit unions, and developed the institutions of informal education in addition to formal Ukrainian schools and university departments (Magosci 1996 , Mokłak 2006 . Th us, the modernization of Western Ukraine was cultural in its essence. On the other hand, weak industrial development led to slow changes in social structure; half of the region's population was still rural in the 1980s (Krawchenko 1985) .
As a result of the 19 th and 20 th centuries' development in terms of modernization, the whole of Central Ukraine occupied an "in-the-middle" position between the west and southeastern regions. Heavy industry was far weaker than in the East. Th e increase in population was very slow until the 1960s when industrialization prompted the rural population to move to cities (Krawchenko, 1985) . All types of industries and the service economy fl ourished only in Kiev, while other parts of the Central Region remained predominantly agricultural. Most of the cities of Central and, especially, Northern Ukraine, with the exception of Kiev, are small that the industrial megalopolises of the East. Th ese smaller cities are much older than their Eastern counterparts, none of which are older than 200 years. One should expect that the Cossack legacy should have had a stronger infl uence on national identity here. On the other hand, since the late 18 th century, the cultural center for this region was located in St Petersburg, and later in Moscow, which caused the quick adoption to Russian language and culture.
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Frontier (McNeill 1964) or civilizational frontline (Dashkevych 1991) . Th ese breaks are important for understanding the identity of the Center. Th e tempo of modernization was much faster in the cities than in the rural areas that it might have caused the preservation of more archaic forms of national identity in villages than in the cities. As the experience of modernity was diff erent in the West and the East of Ukraine, the consequences of a modernization gap could be diff erent in these polar regions as well as in the Center.
Th e second inner break is the West-East break. It has been already mentioned that the history of the Center is marked by a 150-year long Cossack autonomy. However, the history of the Cossack lands was diff erent, which, in turn, has its consequences for Cossacks. Th e northern part of the Center -the Zhytomyr, Chernyhiv, Kiev, and Sumy oblasts, and partially the Cherkasy oblast -are the earliest populated territories that were known in the 9 th -11 th centuries as a part of Kievan Rus. Th ey are defi ned as belonging to the European civilization. In other words, this region is situated on the European part of the Great Frontier -the defi nition which the historian William McNeill gave to the border between Europe and Asia, between the Christian and Muslim worlds, and between the settled grain-growers and the nomads (McNeill, 1964 , Dashkevych, 1991 . Together with the Western Region, Northern Ukraine comprises the country's oldest civilized land, where the autonomous rule of the Rus' dukes existed until their subjugation by the Polish kings.
Th e middle part of the Central Region (Khmelnytsky, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Vinnytsia, and Southern Cherkassy oblast) is located beyond the Great Frontier. Th is region is either classifi ed as a Wild Steppe or as a 'buff er zone' (Yakovenko, 2009 ), a sparsely populated land which, in the 15 th and 16 th centuries, bordered Rus' Lands from the territory of the Crimean Tatar Khanate and from the Turkish and, later, the Ottoman Empire
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. Th e Cossack lands were divided into a "civilized" part where the Registered Cossacks (an analog of the Polish Gentry Register) founded the Hetmanate, a proto-independent state, and the Cossack Sich, a self-ruled and more "barbarian" part that existed independently of the ruling Hetman, whom they opposed (Lypynski, 1926) . Th e Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts belonged to the buff er zone, and this included the north of the Kherson and the west of the Donetsk oblasts. Th ese lands remained sparsely populated until the expansion of Russia in the 18 th century. Th e question is whether the modernization and civilizational hypothesis can explain the political choices of the Center better than its "intermediate" position. In other words, does the internal split -urban/rural or Northern/Middle Central -help to explain the political orientation of the Center?
When the Center diff ers: political choices
In this section, I deal with the question of how the intermediate location of Central Ukraine translates into its political preferences. What does the "intermediate position of Central Ukraine" mean? Whether the Center gets a view closer to the West or to the East depends on variables and studied the period of time. For example, the Center occupies a moderate position concerning Russia and the status of the Russian language, while at the same time the Center agrees with the Western Regions in matters of economic and political liberalization (Khmelko and Wilson, 1998) . During the 1994, 2004 and 2010 presidential elections, when geopolitical orientation become an issue, the Center altogether allied with the West, voting against pro-Russian or Communist candidates (Bilychenko, 2010 , Nichoga, 2010 . However, the Center did not ally during the Kuchmagate crisis (2000) (2001) . Altogether, the interpretation of "the Center" assumes "volatility": a position of uncertainty in the situation of choice, when the victory of a pro-Western or a pro-Russian candidate depends on how the Center votes. As can be seen, the Center, both the Northern and Middle-Central parts, is in between the polarized electorates of the West and Southeast in voting for the candidates in the Parliamentary elections, whether it is the Communist party, the NU, or the Party of Regions. However, it is the distance between the electorates that matters. Th e Center is on the somewhere in the middle between the opposing regions in the case of the CPU; its voting results are more like in the Southeast with respect to the low rating of NU, but more like Galicia in rejection of the main competitor of NU -the Party of Regions. It also resembles Galicia in voting for the "BYUT".
When observing the changes in voting, we can see that the Center is not aligned with the voting outcomes in Galicia or Donbas. In the period of the fall-and-rise of the CPU's popularity in the Center, the drop in the ratings was smaller than in the Donbas and Crimea. Th e Center was neither too enthusiastic when the CPU's popularity was regained. Th e Center did not show a dramatic decline in the support rates for the NU aft er the Orange Revolution. Th e disappointment of the Galicians was much deeper 3 . When certain disillusionment with the rule of the Party of Regions in Donbas and Crimea was observed aft er 2006, the support rating of this party winner only slightly grew in the Center. In the Center, regarding political opponents, the support for their favorite parties was high, but no party received more than 37 percent of the votes from Central Ukraine. It can be said that no party could clinch massive support in the Central region and, correspondingly, no party ever experienced steep losses there.
Th e volatile position of the Center
Th us, the electorate of both parts of Central Ukraine show less emotions in political choice, lacking either strong loyalty, or disappointment with political fi gures. Does this mean that the "volatility" of the Center is a stereotype? Could it be said that the victory of the two competing political programs depends on how the Center voted? Graph 1 shows exactly the opposite: the change of the preferences in the Center in 2002-2006 helped to consolidate the position of the BYUT, but there were no other infl uential changes observed. Is there anything specifi c about political mobilization in the Center?
As Graph 2 depicts, the voters of Central Ukraine show an overwhelming ability to mobilize themselves in response to the radicalization of the political situation. From the fi rst round to the third round, voting for Yushchenko increased sharply by 16 percent. Th e political situation on the eve of the presidential elections of 2004 was tenser than in any other election. Rumors of massive fraud signaled problems at the level of the nation's integrity, prompting a million protesters to rally. Under the aggravating tension, the Center turned radically westward. On Graph 2, one can see that the position the Center shift ed closer to the standing of Galicia 4 . Th e comparison of the voting reported in "Ukrainian Society" to the data from the Central Electoral Committee exhibits another important feature of political behavior in the Center. While in the self-reported votes given to Yushchenko are almost identical with offi cial data Donbas and Galicia, in the Center, reportedly, there were more voicesvotes than the offi cial rating provides. It seems that a bandwagon eff ect was signifi cant throughout Central Ukraine.
Donbas and Crimea are shown together because of the results in these two regions hardly diff ered.
We can observe in Graph 2 that the rural areas of the Center diff ered from the urban units: rural dwellers mobilized faster. It could possibly signify a stronger role of emotions in political choices among the rural dwellers.
Th e regression equation in Table 1 depicts how much the "volatility" of political choice is distributed within the regions of Ukraine and the Ukrainian speaking population. At the moment of this study in 2006, the electorate of Yushchenko was extremely disappointed, as the abysmal rating of his party, the NU, proves. As a result, the disappointed majority of the former NU-supporters split into two groups: those who voted for the BYUT, the party of Yulia Tymoshenko, the defeated part in the Orange coalition's confl ict, and those who voted for the Orange coalition's opponents -the Party of Regions and the CPU. Th e former is defi ned as "moderately disappointed", while the latter as "radically disappointed". Th ese two groups of non-loyal voters are considered as two diff erent degrees of volatility, and they are considered as a dependent variable in the multinomial regression. Th e result of the analysis shows that the voters of the Center are 2,5 times more oft en than the inhabitants of the other regions found among the moderately disappointed. Th e Polish Political Science Review. Polski Przegląd Politologiczny 4(1)/2016
voters from Crimea and Donbas tend to change their preferences in more radical way, but the coeffi cient of 3,3 is not statistically signifi cant. Generally, rural inhabitants tend to more rarely be moderately disappointed than the urban inhabitants, which is marked by the coeffi cient 0.5, making this statistically significant. However, Model III indicates that this is not the case of the rural habitants from the Central region. Th ey changed from Yushchenko's party to that of his former ally, the BYUT, 5 times more oft en than other categories of citizens, and they changed from the Orange coalition's parties in favor of its opponents from the 2004 campaign 3,5 times more frequently. Th us, the volatility of the Center is ensured by its rural inhabitants: they tend to change their loyalty more frequently than rural dwellers of other regions. However, the tendency to be moderately disappointed was also observed among the rural inhabitants of Galicia; therefore, the volatility of rural voters is not exclusively a "Central phenomenon".
Model II illustrates the well-known fact that the NU electorate was Ukrainian speaking (the coeffi cient is 0,2). As for the voters from Crimea and Donbas, introducing the Ukrainian language in Model II reduced the odds of voting for non-Orange forces by almost two times. It can be concluded that it is not all inhabitants of Donbas and Crimea who voted for no Orange forces, but Russian speakers only. Command of Ukrainian as the native language reduces the chance to be found among the radically disappointed respondents by half. Th erefore, adherence to the Ukrainian language guaranteed loyalty to the Orange politicians in 2004 and 2006.
Changes to national identities in Ukraine's regions
Political preferences in Ukraine are indispensably correlated with national identity as politicians in the 2000s took opposite stands toward the national sovereignty of Ukraine, Western versus Russian patterns of integration, and the status of the Russian language. Th e elections of 2004 revealed the interregional split that is oft en described as "civilizational". Th e West and the Center voted for Viktor Yushchenko and the political coalition of the "Oranges", who became the symbols of a fi ght for fairness and transparency in politics and business, national independence, and pro-Western development, while the East and South voted for Viktor Yanukovych, who embodied the values of a post-Soviet type of industrial development, clan-based economics, and a strong relationship with Russia. Th e events of the winter of 2013-2014 brought evidence of a deepening of the interregional split as the Center and West joined massive protests against the pro-Russian policies of Yanukovych.
Th e civilizational split, which is believed to have deep historical roots, has been reinforced by the clash of the two modernization models: the modernization of the Eastern-Southern part based on urbanization and industrialization and the modernization of the Western part based on a European type of social relationships at the levels of public policy, work and education. Th ese two types of modernization could have given the impulse for the development of the diff erent kinds of national identity: "state-nation" and "ethno-state". "State-nation" identity is constituted by a perception of citizenship as a defi ning feature of national identity, while "ethno-nation" is the identity based on memory about one's embeddedness in the nation's territory, its ethnicity, and culture (Haller and Ressler 2006 , Kohn 1967 , Smith 1991 , Brubaker 1992 . State-nation identity is specifi ed as a modern identity, the basis for a political nation, while ethno-state as primordial, developed in stateless nations.
Which type of identity prevails in Ukraine? Th e theory of modernization propels us to expect that urban dwellers, who enjoyed the fruits of modernization of social structure and experienced mobility, would rather prefer the modern "state-nation" identity, while the Ukrainian peasantry would prefer the "ethno-state" national identity (Kasjanov 1999 , Prysiazhniuk 2008 . If state-nation identity is a modern phenomenon, then we would expect that it is more typical for urban populations. Since most of the large modern cities are concentrated in the southeastern part, then the "state-nation" identity will be more common there. On the other hand, Western Ukraine might have developed a state-nation identity due to its cultural modernization and pro-independence orientations. Th e fact that rural population is much higher in Western and Central Ukraine than in the Southern, and, especially, Eastern parts, makes the question even more complicated.
Th e "Ukrainian Society" survey contains a question on "national identity": "How do you identify yourself?"
5 Th e pre-coded answers included the following options: "Inhabitant of the village/city I live in"; "Inhabitant of the region I live in"; "Citizen of Ukraine"; "Representative of a nation, ethnos"; "Citizen of Europe"; or "Citizen of the world". Th e answer "Citizen of Ukraine" is taken as the indicator of state-nation identity.
Identifi cation as a citizen of Ukraine was the most popular option selected by 35 to 60% of those interviewed in 2000-2016. Local identity ("Habitant of the village/city I live in") was second most popular with slightly more than one third of the responses. Regional identity ("Habitant of the region I live in") had 5-7% and ethnic "Representative of a nation, ethnos" had 2-3%. Th ese three types of identities can be typifi ed as "primordial" and considered as a main alternative to the state-nation identity, since they were based on the attachment to ethnicity, tradition, and geography without aspirations to belong to a larger entity -a nation. Th e option "Soviet citizen" is, in a way, a modern national identity. However, a perpetually decreasing number of respondents with the related identity proves that this is rather a phantom identity. Th e smallest number of respondents declared cosmopolitan identities at about 2%.
Graph 3 6 depicts a steady growth of the state-nation identity with the two choices: more noticeable in 2005, and less noticeable in 2014, in the aft ermath of the two revolutions. Th is growth and two rapid increases were observed in all nine regions. Th e interregional diff erences were statistically signifi cant, showing a persistently highest level of national identifi cation in Galicia and the lowest in Crimea. Th e two lines that represent the Center -North and Middle Center -closely follow the lines for the other regions with the notable exception of Crimea. On average, for sixteen years, only in Galicia the identifi cation with the Ukrainian state was stronger than in the Center in all the observation time points, and the East and Crimea were distinctly lower than the other oblasts. 5 Th is question was asked in 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012 . Th e fi eld stage has been carried out by the company SOCIS on January-February of each year during 2000-2004, and on March-April since 2005.
6 Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk Oblasts -Galicia; Volyn and Rivne Oblasts -the Northern West; Chernivtsi and Zakarpattia Regions -the Southern West; Zhytomyr, Chernihiv, Kiev and Sumy oblasts -Northern region; Khmel'nyts'ky, Vinnytsia, Cherkasy, Poltava and Kirovohrad oblasts -the Middle-Center; the Southern Oblasts -Odesa, Kherson and Mykolaiv; Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts -the Southern East; Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts -the East; Crimea. 4(1)/2016
Th e dynamics of all regions, besides Galicia, the Eastern region, and Crimea, are not easy to follow in Graph 3, as it is aff ected by too many trends. Graph 4 presents two parts of the Center, Northern, and Middle-Center, contrary to those three polar regions. In Galicia, the East and Crimea, no "urban-rural" diff erences were detected until 2012 (Graph 6). From 2010-2012, a prominent drop of the state-nation identity was observed in rural areas of both Galician and Eastern regions. Identifi cation with the Ukrainian state remained stable in urban areas, though. Aft er the Maidan and the Revolution of Dignity, the state-nation identity had increased abruptly, but not in the Eastern and Crimean cities.
Crimea and Donbas are merged here with other Eastern oblasts in order to get enough observations in rural areas.
Th e question is whether the variation in state-nation in the Ukrainian regions and within urban and rural population can be translated into political preferences and where the Center will be found on the political scale.
National identity and political choice
Th e remaining question is whether and to what extent political choices are circumvented by national identity, or do each of these two variables develop independently by their own logic. High ratings for a presidential candidate means that he/she embodies some idea that integrates a signifi cant part of a society. If the state-nation identity correlates with voting for Yushchenko, it means that he embodies the national idea of citizenship as a cornerstone of nation-building. However, if he is supported by those with local or regional identity, he embodies strong localism, adherence to tradition, to the Ukrainian language in the Western and Central oblasts, and to a parochial political identity. Th e problem is that Yushchenko was supported massively by the rural and Ukrainian-speaking population of the Center and West, while, according to the "Ukrainian Society" data, state-nation identity was two times less popular among rural dwellers, who are more numerous in Western and Central oblasts, as is the Ukrainian speaking population.
Th e analysis of voting for Yushchenko in 2004 shows that the respondents with state-nation identity voted for him twice and the rural voters 3 times more oft en than the other voters (Table 2) . Th e fact of living in the Center increased the probability that the voter supports Yushchenko by almost 4 times. Th e most powerful predictor of the voting for Yushchenko was Ukrainian language use. Th e introduction of the Ukrainian language in the equation reduced the coeffi cients for the rural and Central regions' population almost by half. Th us, the support for Yushchenko had been localized in the Western oblasts -up to 100% of votes in Galicia -and among Ukrainian speaking and rural populations of Central Ukraine. What is the role of state-nation identity in voting for Yushchenko? Does this role diff er in the regions of Ukraine? Could it be that the urban-rural gap in the development of state-nation identity aff ects the political choice?
Th e interaction term of state-nation identity with the Central region produced a signifi cant coeffi cient with a value much smaller than "1". Th is means that despite voters with state-nation identity and those who live in the Central oblasts supported Yushchenko more, those with a stronger state-nation identity living in the Center supported Yushchenko less than the other categories. Th us, although the defi nition of Yushchenko as a state-nation model works throughout Ukrainian society, it does not work in the Central oblasts, where voting for him does not necessarily mean adherence to a state-nation identity. Th e same result was obtained for the Ukrainian language in use. Th ough Ukrainian speakers tend to vote for Yushchenko more oft en than Russian speakers, in Central Ukraine the Ukrainian speakers tend to vote less compared to Ukrainian speakers in other regions. Th is result must not be misinterpreted. As everywhere else, in Central Ukraine there are more of Yushchenko's electorate among Ukrainian speakers and those with a state-nation identity. However, the Ukrainian language and a state-nation identity play a less important role for political choice in Central Ukraine than in all other regions. It can be argued that neither of the two models -state-nation or ethno-nation -can be applied to the political identity of the Center. It was possible that Yushchenko embodied a model of integration, some inclusive model of statehood that appeals to Russian speaking Ukrainians who comprise one-third of the population of the Center. On the other hand, many of the Russian speakers, supporters of Yushchenko, prefer local identity to state-nation, which means that a state-nation explanation does not fi t here. 
Conclusions
Th is article provides an original framework to analyze the political and national identity of Central Ukraine, usually defi ned as an "in-the-middle" identity, between the West and East. Th e analysis brought some evidence that Central Ukraine has an identity of its own, circumvented by its history, complex and known by early attempts at state building.
Residents of the Center are not inclined to support radical political opponents, and they do not change their political allegiance too easily. Still, the electorate of the Center can be quickly involved in the political process in a situation when the geopolitical orientations of Ukraine are in question, as it was during the Orange Revolution. In the period of national upheavals like the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity, the population of Central Ukraine aligned with Western Ukraine.
Rural inhabitants of the Center are fast in mobilization if national security is in question, but they also tend to be disappointed easily. Th e same tendency is observed with the development of the state-nation identity. Identifi cation with the Ukrainian state grew and fell in correspondence with the rise and fall of political forces which attracted the sympathy of the rural population. In contrast, the urban population of the Center, especially of its Northern part, show a more steady development of identifi cation with the Ukrainian state, the state-nation identity. A longitudinal study of this urban-rural split should be done in order to understand whether it is the specifi city of the Central region or maybe some other regions also show the same sort of split.
Th e most interesting fi nding is the particular model of correlation between national identity and voting preferences, which was observed among the respondents of the Central oblasts. While in Galicia and Eastern Ukraine state-nation identity and the language in use explain the choice or the presidential candidate in a predicable manner, in Central Ukraine it looks diff erent. While wherever else in Ukraine voters with stronger state-nation identity voted more oft en for Yushchenko, in Central Ukraine they voted less for
